Now is probably a good time to mention that I have a paper shredder. When I was shopping for a shredder, the basic requirement is that it must be relatively “secure”. Straight cut shredders (that produce long straight strips) are definitely not secure.
Ultimately I settled on the CARL DS-3000 personal paper shredder. The DS-3000 is a cross-cut shredder which produces “particles” no larger than 2mm x 4.5mm and this meets DIN security level 4. These days, the NSA mandates 1mm x 5mm “particles” for classified documents.
At this point, it’s probably helpful to show you what my shredder bin looks like:
From the particles, you can make out various truncated words such as “A/C”, “exp” and the number “5”, but it’s almost impossible to reconstruct any bank balances or personal information from it.
This particular model was the right balance between my budget and the level of security. Plus, the shredder is compact enough to sit on your desk. I bought it in 2009 and I use it every couple of months when I have accumulated enough material that needs to be destroyed.
I was in the middle of shredding papers when it suddenly stopped working. Now the shredder does not respond when I stick paper into its slot. The LED indicator looks dimmer than usual when it is turned on.
But I’m not ready to give up on it just yet…
The 31st Chaos Communication Congress (31C3) ended just 3 days ago, and there were several interesting talks.
They have got live streaming of the event over the web, as well as encourage you to use an external player with RTMP or HLS support. The video streams were very reliable and best of all, it’s available in HD. In comparison, I tried the Apple live event once and it was really crappy. For one, the HLS1 URL is not publicly available , so someone had to dig that out and post it. Even after that, the audio stream was (I believe, unintentionally) a mix of both English and Chinese simultaneously.
The 31C3 video recordings were also uploaded very quickly after the event. This is much quicker than other events such as Black Hat (although as an attendee, you do get a copy of the stuff on a DVD). A really big kudos to the organizers and the video production team!
If you don’t have time to listen to each and every talk, here are a few selected talks that were interesting to me, as well as a short summary to see if it’s worth 30 or 60 minutes of your time.
A full list of talks can be found here: http://media.ccc.de/browse/congress/2014/index.html
Inspired by Nikolay Elenkov’s detailed technical posts on Android Explorations, I decided to dig into the Android source code myself and document the package verification mechanism in Android.
Package verification was introduced in Android 4.2 to allow for apps to be verified or checked before they are installed. If you have tried to install a malicious app on a production Android device, you might have seen the following screen, displayed by the verifier:
Android was built in such a way that it tries to be generic for third-parties to implement stuff. Package verification is a feature that is currently only used and implemented by Google, but it is abstracted in such a way that any manufacturer can implement their own. Documentation and examples on how to do this is almost non-existent, although anyone determined enough can read the Android source code and figure it out for themselves.
Last week as I was making my rounds at the supermarket, I came across this digital bathroom scale on sale. With some membership card, the discount was almost 50% and at S$16, I thought that was a pretty good deal. It is “wireless” in that it has a separate display unit that could be detached from the scale itself. This bathroom scale had “HACK ME” written all over it.
It turns out that this bathroom scale is the EB9121 made by a Chinese (OEM?) company called Zhongshan Camry Electronic Co. Ltd (or simply Camry). The box specifically mentions that it uses infrared for transmission, and given that I had some experience looking at IR signals, I thought it would be rather straightforward.
Last month, I had the opportunity to fly halfway around the world to attend RSA Conference 2013. Everyone was given a lanyard and badge which contains your information entered during registration. When you visit booths, they can then scan your badge to collect your information and follow up by sending you spam.
The scanner varies across different booths, but mostly it’s an Android device that ran a custom software. Since it had a large NXP logo, let’s try to read it with the NFC TagInfo app. Looks like the tag identifies itself as a NDEF message but the data is gibberish.